How do financial reforms affect inequality through financial sector competition? Evidence from Africa by Asongu, Simplice A
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
How do financial reforms affect
inequality through financial sector
competition? Evidence from Africa
Simplice A Asongu
1. January 2013
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44410/
MPRA Paper No. 44410, posted 16. February 2013 00:25 UTC
1 
 
 
How do financial reforms affect inequality through financial sector 
competition? Evidence from Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simplice  A. Asongu 
African Governance and Development Institute,  
P.O. Box 18 SOA/ 1365 Yaoundé, Cameroon. 
E-mail: asongusimplice@yahoo.com 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How do financial reforms affect inequality through financial sector 
competition? Evidence from Africa 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 In the first empirical study on how financial reforms have been instrumental in 
mitigating inequality through financial sector competition, we contribute at the same time to 
the macroeconomic literature on measuring financial development and respond to the growing 
field of economic development by means of informal sector promotion. Hitherto, unexplored 
financial sector concepts of formalization, semi-formalization and informalization are 
introduced. Four main findings are established: (1) while formal financial development 
decreases inequality, financial sector formalization increases it; (2) whereas semi-formal 
financial development increases inequality, the effect of financial semi-formalization is 
unclear; (3) both informal financial development and financial informalization have an 
income equalizing effect and; (4) non-formal financial development is pro-poor. Policy 
implications are discussed.  
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1. Introduction  
 After over two decades of financial reforms, poverty and inequality undoubtedly 
remain important challenges to economic and human developments in Africa. Despite this 
important policy concern, hitherto owing to the scarcity and lack of relevant data on income-
inequality, very little scholarly focus has been devoted to the continent (Kai & Hamori, 2009; 
Batuo et al., 2010; Asongu, 2012a). In the 1980s and 1990s, most African countries embarked 
on a series of structural and policy adjustments in the financial sector as part of economic 
reforms with the ultimate goal of given impetus to economic growth as well as improving 
financial and economic efficiency (Janine & Elbadawi, 1991). Surprisingly, as far as we have 
reviewed, there is currently no study that has investigated how financial reforms intended to 
address African dire needs have affected inequality through financial sector competition.  
 In light of the above, drawing from the experience of a continent that has been 
implementing development financial reforms, this study aims to investigate the income-
redistributive effects of financial reforms through financial sector competition. The 
contribution of the study to the literature is sixfold. Firstly, we restrict our sample to African 
countries because of their stubbornly high inequality levels despite over two decades of 
reforms (Asongu, 2012a). Secondly, we steer clear of past literature that has failed to address 
the instrumentality of financial reforms and financial sector competition in investigating the 
finance-inequality nexus (Kai & Hamori, 2009; Batuo et al., 2010; Asongu, 2012a). Thirdly, 
while past studies have assessed the inequality-finance nexus from a formal financial sector 
standpoint, we argue that failure to introduce the informal financial sector that captures most 
pro-poor financial activities is a substantial missing link in the literature (Kai & Hamori, 
2009; Batuo et al., 2010; Asongu, 2012a). Hence, we introduce measures of absolute and 
relative informal finance. Fourthly, two of the three studies in the literature identified above 
(Kai & Hamori, 2009; Asongu, 2012a) are based on data of the same time span (1980-2002). 
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Therefore, it could be argued that the studies have captured first generation financial reforms 
for the most part. Hence, the need for updated findings on second generational reforms for 
focused policy implications. Our data spans from 1996-2010. Fifthly, a motivation for this 
study also draws from the burgeoning phenomenon of knowledge economy (Asongu, 2012b) 
and soaring mobile banking activities (Asongu, 2012c) that are captured by the informal 
financial sector for the most part. Sixthly, the present study unites two streams of research by 
contributing at the same time to the macroeconomic literature on measuring financial 
development and responding to the growing field of economic development by means of 
informal sector promotion, microfinance, mobile banking, knowledge economy (KE)…etc, in 
suggesting a practicable  way to disentangle the effects of various financial sectors on 
inequality. Ultimately, this study steers clear of existing African finance-inequality literature 
both from theoretical and methodological standpoints
1
.   
 The remainder of this paper is organized in the following manner. Data and 
methodology are discussed and outlined respectively in Section 2. Empirical analysis and 
discussion of results are reported in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
We examine a panel of 28 African countries with data from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) and the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of the 
World Bank (WB) for the period 1996-2010. Limitations to the number of countries and 
periodicity of analysis has a threefold justification: (1) constraints in data availability on 
inequality; (2) the imperative to capture burgeoning phenomena (of mobile banking, mobile 
                                                 
1
 In summary, the current paper steers clear of existing literature (Kai and Hamori, 2009; Batuo et al., 2010; 
Asongu, 2012a)  on the African inequality-finance nexus from three standpoints: (1) difference in variables with 
the introduction of previously missing financial (informal and semi-formal) components into the debate; (2) 
methodological innovations, with the finance-inequality nexus contingent on the instrumentality of financial 
sector reforms and; (3) the introduction of absolute and relative  measures of financial sector competition that 
take account of the formal, semi-formal and informal financial sectors.  
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phone penetration, KE...etc) that have improved the informal financial sector over the past 
decade and; (3) the motivation to steer clear of past studies by capturing the effects of second 
generational financial reforms for more updated and focused policy implications.  
 The dependent variable is the GINI index that measures income-inequality. The 
independent variables are absolute and relatively measures of financial sector competition 
recently documented in the financial development literature (Asongu, 2012b). These 
variables, as defined in Appendix 3, are the result of a rethinking of the IFS (2008) financial 
system definition that does not incorporate the informal financial sector into its definition of 
the financial system
2
. More so, since a great chunk of the monetary base in developing 
countries does not transit through formal financial institutions, the equation of financial depth 
in the perspective money supply to liquid liabilities has substantially hallowed financial 
development literature (Asongu, 2012b). Hence, by relaxing the IFS (2008) definition and 
introducing a previously missing informal financial sector (as well as disentangling the pre-
existing measurement into its constituent components), absolute and relative financial 
development indicators have been theoretically proposed and empirically validated in recent 
financial development literatures (Asongu, 2012bc).  
The instrumental variables include measures of financial allocation efficiency (from 
banking system and financial system standpoints), financial activity (from banking system 
and financial system perspectives) and financial depth (from overall economic and financial 
system views). Three justifications could be provided for the choice of the three instrumental 
variables: (1) financial reforms sought to improve the transformation of mobilize financial 
resources into credit for economic operators (financial allocation efficiency); (2) the reforms 
also sought to improve financial activity through the granting of credit (financial activity), 
especially owing to the substantially documented issues of surplus liquidity in African 
                                                 
2
 Lines 24, 25 and 45 of the IFS, October, 2008.  
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financial institutions (Saxegaard, 2006) and; (3) the reforms were also intended to promote 
the creation of bank accounts so that a considerable chunk of the monetary base could transit 
via formal financial institutions (financial depth) so as to enhance monetary policy efficiency.  
 In the finance-inequality regressions, we control for economic prosperity (GDP 
growth), population growth, foreign aid, human development and trade. The effect of GDP 
growth on inequality is conditional on the even-distribution of fruits of economic prosperity; 
hence the expected sign can be positive or negative. The impact of foreign aid on inequality is 
contingent on the quality of institutions. However, most foreign aid is channeled by locally 
based NGOs which directly affect the targeted population. Therefore we expect a negative 
sign. Population growth should increase inequality because the burden of demographic 
change in African countries is borne by the faction of the population in the low-income strata. 
This expected sign is consistent with recent African inequality literature (AfDB, 2012, p.3).  
The effect of trade on inequality is ambiguous and depends on many factors. However from 
intuition, trade can either increase or decrease inequality depending on the proportion of the 
poor relying on agricultural exports. Cheap imports could increase savings and hence, 
indirectly improve the income-distribution of the poor. In the same line of thinking, too much 
imports of ‘substitution goods’ produced by domestic industries could fuel income-inequality 
if majority of the population in  the lower-income brackets depend substantially on the 
affected industries for subsistence income. The impact of human development on inequality 
depends on the proportion of the poor in the following three dimensions (with respect to 
national average): GDP per capita, life expectancy and, literacy rate. 
The summary statistics (with presentation of countries), correlation analysis (showing 
the relationships between key variables used in the paper), and variable definitions are 
detailed in the appendices. The ‘summary statistics’ (Panel A of Appendix 1) of the variables 
used in the panel regressions shows that, there is quite some variation in the data utilized so 
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that one should be confident that reasonable estimated nexuses should emerge. Panel B of 
Appendix 1 presents the 28 countries of the panel. The purpose of the correlation matrix 
(Appendix 2) is to avoid issues resulting from overparametization and multicolinearity. From 
a preliminary assessment of the correlation coefficients, there do not appear to be any serious 
issues in terms of the relationships to be estimated.  Appendix 3 provides definitions and 
corresponding sources of the variables.  
 
2.2 Methodology  
2.2.1 Endogeneity  
We are concerned with endogeneity for three main reasons: (1) we might have omitted 
some variables of financial sector reforms not incorporated in the FDSD; (2) while financial 
development affects inequality, it cannot be ruled-out that the state of inequality shapes 
financial policies (especially in the informal sector), hence an issue of reverse causality and; 
(3) the problem statement by definition presupposes the existence of endogeneity by its 
contingency on the use of ‘financial reform’ instrumental variables. To tackle the endogeneity 
concern, we shall first assess its presence with the Hausman test before employing an 
estimation technique that is relevant to the outcome of the test.    
 
2.2.2 Estimation technique  
We adopt a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation 
technique for two reasons: on the one hand, it tackles the puzzle of endogeneity and; on the 
other hand, it is compatible with the problem statement of the study which aims to assess the 
instrumentality of financial reforms in the effect of financial sector competition on inequality. 
Accordingly, IV estimation addresses the concern of endogeneity and hence avoids the 
inconsistency of estimated coefficients by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) when the exogenous 
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variables are correlated with the error term in the main equation. The 2SLS estimation 
procedure will entail the following steps: 
First-stage regression:  
  
 itiit sInstrumentFin )(10  it                             (1)                                                                                                          
 
Second-stage regression: 
 
 itit FinInequality )(10  itiX  it              (2)       
                                                                                 
 
In Equation 2, X is a set of control variables (GDP growth, population growth, foreign 
aid, human development and trade). In the first and second equations, it   and it  respectively 
represent the error terms. Instrumental variables are: money supply, liquid liabilities, banking 
system efficiency, financial system efficiency, banking system activity and financial system 
activity.  Inequality represents the GINI index. We adopt the following steps in the IV 
analysis: (1) justify the choice of a 2SLS over an OLS estimation technique with the 
Hausman-test for endogeneity; (2) verify the instruments are exogenous to the endogenous 
components of the explaining variables (financial sector competition channels) and; (3) ensure 
the instruments are valid and not correlated with the error-term in the main equation with an 
Over-identifying Restrictions (OIR) test. Further robustness checks will be ensured with; (1) 
robust Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors and; (2) the 
use of two-year, three-year and five-year non-overlapping intervals (NOI) to mitigate short-
run disturbances that may loom substantially large. 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1 Presentation of results  
This section aims to tackle the two main issues discussed in the motivation of the 
paper, notably: (1) whether financial sector reforms are instrumental in the effect of financial 
sector competition on inequality and; (2) assessing how financial sector competition plays out 
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in inequality reduction. Specifically, addressing the second issue will depend on the results of 
the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: Improvement of the formal financial sector both in absolute (GDP-based) and 
relative (M2-based) terms mitigates inequality. Proposition 1 and Proposition 5 will tackle 
this hypothesis in absolute and relative views respectively. 
Hypothesis 2: The semi-formal financial sector decreases inequality both in absolute (GDP-
based) and relative (M2-based) terms. Proposition 2 and Proposition 6 will examine this 
hypothesis in absolute and relative terms respectively. 
Hypothesis 3: The informal financial sector mitigates inequality both in absolute (GDP-based) 
and relative (M2-based) terms. Proposition 3 and Proposition 7 will assess this hypothesis 
from absolute and relative perspectives respectively. 
Hypothesis 4: The non-formal (informal and semi-formal) financial sector decreases 
inequality both in absolute (GDP-based) and relative (M2-based) terms. Proposition 4 and 
Proposition 8 will address this hypothesis from absolute and relative standpoints respectively.  
Whereas the first issue is addressed by the Sargan OIR test, tackling the second 
depends on both the results of the Sargan OIR test and the significance of estimated 
coefficients (propositions). The null hypothesis of the Sargan test is the position that, the 
financial sector reforms explain inequality only through financial sector competition 
mechanisms, conditional on the control variables. Hence, a rejection of this null hypothesis is 
a rejection of the view that the financial sector reform instruments do not explain inequality 
beyond financial sector competition channels. A Hausman test is performed before every 
2SLS-IV approach. The null hypothesis of this test is the position that, estimated coefficients 
by OLS are efficient and consistent. Therefore, a rejection of this null hypothesis points to the 
concern of endogeneity due to inconsistent estimates and hence, lends credit to the choice of 
the IV estimation technique. Accordingly, for all the models (Table 2-3), there is an 
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overwhelming rejection of the null hypothesis of the Hausman test, hence, lending credit to 
the appropriateness of the choice of an IV estimation technique. Table 2 entails regressions 
with absolute (GDP based) financial sector competition measures while Table 3 shows those 
for relative (M2 based) financial sector competition measures. While Panel A of both tables 
contains regressions without HAC standard errors, Panel B, irrespective of tables reflects an 
output that is HAC standard errors consistent.  
As concerns the first issue, the failure to reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan test in 
all the models is an indication that, financial sector reforms are instrumental in the effect of 
financial sector competition on inequality.  With regard to the second issue, the following 
could be established from the findings of Tables 2-3 summarized in Table 1. (1) For 
Hypothesis 1, while formal financial development mitigates inequality (Proposition 1), 
financial sector formalization increases it (Proposition 5). (2) For Hypothesis 2, while semi-
formal financial development increases inequality (Proposition 2), the effect of financial 
semi-informalization is not clear (Proposition 6). (3) For Hypothesis 3, both informal 
financial development (Proposition 3) and financial sector informalization (Proposition 7) 
mitigate inequality. (4) According for Hypothesis 4, non-formal financial development 
decreases inequality (Proposition 4). However, the effect of financial sector nonformalization 
could not be assessed owing to issues of multicolinearity.  
 
Table 1: Summary of results (effects on income-inequality) 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4 
     
Prop.1: Formal financial sector development -    
Prop.5: Financial sector formalization  +    
     
Prop.2: Semi-formal fin. sector development  +   
Prop.6: Financial sector semi-formalization   ?   
     
Prop.3: Informal fin. sector development     -  
Prop.7: Financial sector informalization    -  
     
Prop.4: Non-formal fin. sector development     - 
Prop.8: Financial sector non-formalisation     na 
     
Prop: Proposition. Fin: Financial. ?: both positive and negative signs. na: not applicable owing to issues of muliticolinearity.   
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 Most of the significant control variables have the expected signs. Economic prosperity 
and foreign aid mitigate inequality while population growth, human development and trade 
increase it. The effect of GDP growth is an indication that the fruits of economic prosperity 
are somehow evenly distributed; while that of foreign-aid indicates that development 
assistance reaches its target audience through NGO channels. The positive effect of 
demographic change is consistent with recent African inequality literature (AfDB, 2012) and 
broadly indicates that, the burden of population growth is supported by the population in 
lower-income brackets whose household income-growth is sluggishly not in tandem with 
household demographic shifts. The positive effect of trade is an indication that there are too 
much imports of ‘substitution goods’ produced by domestic industries; as majority of the 
population in the lower-income brackets depend substantially on the affected industries for 
subsistence income. The positive impact of human development on inequality means that 
improvements of its constituent elements (GDP per capita, life expectancy and literacy rate) is 
unequal across income-groups and skewed towards the wealthy.  
 
Table 2: Two-Stage Least Squares estimates for GDP based measures   
 Panel A: Estimations without HAC standard errors  
 Full data 2 Year  NOI 3 Year NOI 5 Year NOI 
Constant  54.407*** 54.407*** 52.480*** 52.480*** 47.903*** 47.903*** 43.097* 43.097* 
 (21.77) (21.77) (3.296) (3.296) (2.820) (2.820) (1.874) (1.874) 
Proposition 1 -14.065*** -14.065*** -3.037 -3.037 2.064 2.064 5.935 5.935 
 (-3.941) (-3.941) (-0.210) (-0.210) (0.123) (0.123) (0.267) (0.267) 
Proposition 2 207.367* 275.29** 455.11*** 570.91*** 579.13*** 694.98*** 523.48* 633.13* 
 (1.822) (2.138) (3.333) (3.961) (2.379) (2.745) (1.653) (1.925) 
Proposition 3 -67.923*** --- -115.79*** --- -115.84*** --- -109.6*** --- 
 (-3.453)  (-7.902)  (-5.910)  (-4.556)  
Proposition 4 --- -67.923*** --- -115.79*** --- -115.8*** --- -109.64*** 
  (-3.453)  (-7.902)  (-5.910)  (-4.556) 
Economic Prosperity  --- --- -0.457 -0.457 -0.901 -0.901 -1.060 -1.060 
   (-0.581) (-0.581) (-0.732) (-0.732) (-0.690) (-0.690) 
Population  Growth  --- --- -0.447 -0.447 1.604 1.604 3.473 3.473 
   (-0.071) (-0.071) (0.232) (0.232) (0.370) (0.370) 
Foreign Aid -0.519*** -0.519*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (-3.132) (-3.132)       
Human Development  0.153* 0.153* --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (1.719) (1.719)       
Hausman test  58.318*** 58.318*** 47.357*** 47.357*** 27.525*** 27.525*** 13.155*** 13.155*** 
 [ 0.000] [0.000 ] [0.000 ] [ 0.000] [0.000 ] [ 0.000] [0.004] [0.004] 
Sargan  OIR test  0.697 0.697 0.239 0.239 0.227 0.227 2.461 2.461 
 [0.403 ] [0.403 ] [0.624 ] [0.624 ] [0.633] [0.633] [0.116] [0.116] 
R² 0.205 0.205 0.221 0.221 0.171 0.171 0.125 0.125 
Fischer  18.139*** 18.139*** 15.008*** 15.008*** 8.187*** 8.187*** 4.846*** 4.846*** 
Observations  258 258 173 173 107 107 69 69 
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 Panel B: Estimations with HAC standard errors   
 Full data 2 Year  NOI 3 Year NOI 5 Year NOI 
Constant  54.407*** 54.407*** 52.480* 52.480* 47.903* 47.903* 43.097 43.097 
 (12.43) (12.43) (1.699) (1.699) (1.770) (1.770) (1.457) (1.457) 
Proposition 1 -14.065** -14.065** -3.037 -3.037 2.064 2.064 5.935 5.935 
 (-2.149) (-2.149) (-0.117) (-0.117) (0.087) (0.087) (0.228) (0.228) 
Proposition 2 207.367 275.29 455.11* 570.91** 579.13* 694.98** 523.48 633.13* 
 (1.096) (1.290) (1.733) (2.046) (1.938) (2.272) (1.496) (1.757) 
Proposition 3 -67.923** --- -115.79*** --- -115.84*** --- -109.64*** --- 
 (-2.043)  (-5.148)  (-6.107)  (-5.002)  
Proposition 4 --- -67.923** --- --- --- -115.84*** --- -109.64*** 
  (-2.043)    (-6.107)  (-5.002) 
Economic Prosperity  --- --- -0.457 -0.457 -0.901 -0.901 -1.060 -1.060 
   (-0.332) (-0.332) (-0.629) (-0.629) (-0.741) (-0.741) 
Population  Growth  --- --- -0.447 -0.447 1.604 1.604 3.473 3.473 
   (-0.036) (-0.036) (0.148) (0.148) (0.297) (0.297) 
Foreign Aid -0.519* -0.519* --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (-1.650) (-1.650)       
Human Development  0.153 0.153 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (1.058) (1.058)       
Hausman test  58.318*** 58.318*** 47.357*** 47.357*** 27.525*** 27.525*** 13.155*** 13.155*** 
 [0.000] [ 0.000] [0.000] [ 0.000] [0.000 ] [0.000] [0.004] [0.004] 
Sargan  OIR test  0.697 0.697 0.239 0.239 0.227 0.227 2.461 2.461 
 [0.403] [0.403] [0.624] [0.624] [0.633 ] [0.633 ] [0.116 ] [0.116] 
Adjusted R² 0.205 0.205 0.221 0.221 0.171 0.171 0.125 0.125 
Fischer  5.333*** 5.333*** 39.004*** 39.004*** 21.318*** 21.318*** 10.174*** 10.174*** 
Observations  258 258 173 173 107 107 69 69 
         
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Z-statistics in parentheses. [ ]: P-values. Proposition 1: Formal 
financial development. Proposition 2: Semi-formal financial development. Proposition 3: Informal financial development. 
Proposition 4: Non-formal (semi-formal and informal) financial development. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions Test. NOI: 
Nonoverlapping intervals. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Two-Stage Least Squares estimates for M2 based measures    
 Panel A: Estimations without HAC standard errors  
 Full data 2 Year  NOI 3 Year NOI 5 Year NOI 
Constant  29.851*** 13.740 -12.453 36.935*** -3.513 44.778*** 2.855 43.363*** 
 (5.505) (1.357) (-0.865) (5.002) (-0.208) (4.480) (0.174) (4.189) 
Proposition 5 -16.110 --- 49.388*** --- 48.291*** --- 40.508*** --- 
 (-1.420)  (4.424)  (3.662)  (3.270)  
Proposition 6 -114.68*** -98.574** 230.222* 180.833 242.67 194.37 175.91 135.40 
 (-2.917) (-2.237) (1.785) (1.460) (1.341) (1.105) (0.956) (0.751) 
Proposition 7 --- 16.110 --- -49.388*** --- -48.291*** --- -40.50*** 
  (1.420)  (-4.424)  (-3.662)  (-3.270) 
Economic Prosperity  --- --- -2.118* -2.118* -3.302* -3.302* -2.703 -2.703 
   (-1.667) (-1.667) (-1.775) (-1.775) (-1.429) (-1.429) 
Population  Growth  5.957*** 5.957*** 10.912*** 10.912*** 9.430** 9.430** 8.484** 8.484** 
 (4.889) (4.889) (3.384) (3.384) (2.500) (2.500) (2.212) (2.212) 
Human Development  0.550*** 0.550*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (4.474) (4.474)       
Trade 0.178* 0.178* --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (1.779) (1.779)       
Hausman test  177.12*** 177.12*** 118.39*** 118.39*** 71.956*** 71.956*** 34.852*** 34.852*** 
 [ 0.000] [0.000 ] [0.000] [0.000] [ 0.000] [0.000 ] [0.000] [0.000] 
Sargan  OIR test  2.182 2.182 4.177 4.177 2.484 2.484 4.413 4.413 
 [0.139] [0.139 ] [0.123] [0.123] [0.288 ] [0.288 ] [0.110] [0.110] 
Adjusted R² 0.097 0.097 0.007 0.007 0.023 0.023 0.012 0.012 
Fischer  11.221*** 11.221*** 4.990*** 4.990*** 3.457** 3.457*** 2.742** 2.742** 
Observations  249 249 173 173 107 107 69 69 
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 Panel B: Estimations with HAC standard errors   
 Full data 2 Year  NOI 3 Year NOI 5 Year NOI 
Constant  29.851** 13.740 -12.453 36.935*** -3.513 44.778*** 2.855 43.363*** 
 (2.290) (0.681) (-0.561) (3.310) (-0.167) (3.886) (0.165) (4.095) 
Proposition 5 -16.110 --- 49.388*** --- 48.291*** --- 40.508*** --- 
 (-0.690)  (3.504)  (4.169)  (3.317)  
Proposition 6 -114.68 -98.574 230.222 180.83 242.67 194.37 175.91 135.40 
 (-1.076) (-0.867) (1.376) (1.145) (1.253) (1.036) (0.916) (0.731) 
Proposition 7 --- 16.110 --- -49.388*** --- -48.29*** --- -40.50*** 
  (0.690)  (-3.504)  (-4.169)  (-3.317) 
Economic Prosperity  --- --- -2.118 -2.118 -3.302** -3.302** -2.703 -2.703 
   (-1.487) (-1.487) (-2.182) (-2.182) (-1.564) (-1.564) 
Population  Growth  5.957* 5.957* 10.912** 10.912** 9.430* 9.430* 8.484** 8.484** 
 (1.956) (1.956) (1.992) (1.992) (1.872) (1.872) (1.976) (1.976) 
Human Development  0.550** 0.550** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (2.437) (2.437)       
Trade  --- 0.178 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.839)       
Hausman test  177.127*** 177.12*** 118.39*** 118.39*** 71.956*** 71.956*** 34.852*** 34.852*** 
 [ 0.000] [0.000 ] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000 ] [ 0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Sargan  OIR test  2.182 2.182 4.177 4.177 2.484 2.484 4.413 4.413 
 [0.139 ] [0.139 ] [0.123] [0.123] [0.288 ] [0.288] [0.110] [0.110] 
Adjusted R² 0.097 0.097 0.007 0.007 0.023 0.023 0.012 0.012 
Fischer  4.735*** 4.735*** 4.168*** 4.168*** 7.594*** 7.594*** 3.247** 3.247** 
Observations  249 249 173 173 107 107 69 69 
         
 *;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Z-statistics in parentheses. [ ]:P-values. Proposition 5: 
Financial development formalization. Proposition 6: Financial development semi-formalization. Proposition 7: Financial 
development informalization. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions Test. NOI: Nonoverlapping intervals. HAC: 
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent.  
 
 
3.2 Discussion of results and policy implications 
3.2.1 Discussion of results 
 The conclusions from the tested hypotheses are as follows: (1) formal and informal 
financial development have an inequality mitigating tendency; (2) financial sector 
formalization (informalization) increases (decreases) inequality; (3) semiformal financial 
development has an income disequalizing effect and; (4) nonformal financial development has 
a positive income redistributive effect. We shall devote space to discussing the formal and 
informal financial sectors in detail because, for them we have obtained significant results both 
in terms of GDP and money supply (M2). 
Firstly, the fact that formal and informal financial developments have an inequality 
mitigating tendency implies that, an improvement in their shares relative to economic 
prosperity (GDP growth) decreases inequality. This interpretation can be further elucidated on 
two counts. On the one hand, holding GDP growth and other things constant, formal and 
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informal financial development which are constituents of GDP growth will mitigate poverty 
by its equalizing effect on income-distribution. On the other hand, if the shares of formal and 
informal financial sector developments in GDP growth are greater in comparison to other 
macroeconomic components of GDP growth, the direct effect on income distribution will be 
an equalizing one.  The equalizing effect of the formal financial sector is consistent with 
recent African inequality literature (Batuo et al., 2010).  From a broader point of view, the 
findings are also in line with empirical (Beck et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2007; Kai & Hamori, 
2009) and theoretical (Galor & Zeira, 1993; Banerjee & Newman, 1993) literature which 
postulate a negative and linear relationship between financial development and income-
inequality.  
 Secondly, the negative (positive) income redistributive effect of financial sector 
formalization (informalization) means, the effect of the formal financial sector (growing at the 
expense of other financial sectors) increases inequality whereas the effect of the informal 
financial sector (growing to the detriment of other financial sectors) decreases inequality. This 
explanation is logical from common sense because, the increase in bank deposits (liquid 
liabilities) in the formal banking sector can only result from the fruits of the faction of the 
population in possession of bank accounts, which is that of the higher- or middle-income 
brackets. In the same line of thought, when growth in money supply (M2) or an extensive use 
of currency in an economy transits through the formal banking sector to the detriment of the 
informal and semi-formal financial sectors, the natural consequence is soaring inequality. This 
interpretation can further be substantiated with present-day statistics which show that, most 
formal banking institutions are concentrated in urban areas of African countries. With a 
substantial proportion of the poor domiciled in rural areas without access to bank accounts, a 
competitive advantage in the formal banking sector’s shares of M2 is not good for the poor.  
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3.2.2 Policy implications  
 Based on the weight of available empirical evidence, we recommend the following to 
governments of sampled countries in particular and developing countries in general. (1) 
Encourage the establishment of formal financial institutions in rural areas. But why? We have 
found that formal banking growth in GDP terms is pro-poor (Proposition 1). However, 
policies of formal banking establishment in rural areas should not be at the expense of 
informal financial development; as we have also found that financial sector formalization (or 
growth in M2 terms) is not pro-poor (Proposition 5). (2) As an overall policy 
recommendation, the poor should be provided incentives for bank account creation. The broad 
significance of the results demonstrates that financial development is essential in reducing 
income inequality in African countries. Widening access to informal financial intermediary 
markets (by means of new KE mechanisms, mobile banking…etc), especially by targeting 
those at the lower income strata and the rural population would help reduce the persistent 
income gap between the rural and urban population. A possible way of improving financial 
access to the poor is to oriented policy towards the reduction of information asymmetries that 
increase the operating cost of financial institutions.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In the first empirical study on how financial reforms have been instrumental in 
mitigating inequality through financial sector competition, we have contributed at the same 
time to the macroeconomic literature on measuring financial development and responded to 
the growing field of economic development by means of informal sector promotion. Hitherto, 
unexplored financial sector concepts of formalization, semi-formalization and informalization 
have been introduced. Four main findings have been established: (1) while formal financial 
development decreases inequality, financial sector formalization increases it; (2) whereas 
semi-formal financial development increases inequality, the effect of financial semi-
16 
 
formalization is unclear; (3) both informal financial development and financial 
informalization have an income equalizing effect and; (4) non-formal financial development 
is pro-poor. Policy implications have been discussed. 
 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary statistics and presentation of countries  
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
  Mean S.D Min Max Obser. 
       
Inequality GINI  Coefficient 43.104 6.828 29.760 67.400 356 
       
GDP-based 
financial 
development 
indicators   
Proposition 1 0.255 0.204 0.036 0.935 363 
Proposition 2 0.003 0.010 -0.007 0.097 419 
Proposition 3 0.050 0.055 -0.292 0.198 419 
Proposition 4 0.053 0.057 -0.290 0.244 419 
       
 
M2-based 
measures   
Proposition 5 0.749 0.161 0.175 1.456 360 
Proposition 6 0.011 0.036 -0.024 0.224 360 
Proposition 7 0.238 0.161 -0.457 0.824 360 
Proposition 8  0.238 0.161 -0.457 0.824 360 
       
 
Control 
variables  
 
Human Development 1.913 8.0128 0.204 47.486 341 
Economic Prosperity  4.273 3.710 -16.740 27.462 420 
Foreign Aid 9.447 8.946 -0.251 54.785 392 
Population growth  2.275 0.741 0.042 4.146 420 
Trade  68.687 29.967 21.574 187.68 401 
       
Financial Depth 
IV  
Money Supply (M2) 0.322 0.219 0.076 1.141 360 
Liquidity Liabilities (Fdgdp) 0.260 0.207 0.037 0.948 363 
       
Financial 
Efficiency IV 
Banking System Efficiency( BcBd) 0.786 0.352 0.206 2.249 379 
Financial System Efficiency (FcFd) 0.848 0.462 0.214 2.587 363 
       
Financial 
Activity  IV 
Banking System Activity (Pcrb) 0.203 0.190 0.019 0.869 363 
Financial System Activity(Pcrbof)  0.237 0.279 0.019 1.739 363 
       
Panel B: Presentation of Countries 
Botswana, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, 
Zambia, Niger, Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic.  
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obser: Observations. IV: Instrumental Variable.  
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Appendix 2: Correlation analysis 
Financial Dependent Variables Control Variables Dependent 
Variable 
 
GDP-Based Measures M2-Based  Measures   
Prop1 Prop2 Prop3 Prop4 Prop5 Prop6 Prop7 Prop8 Trade IHDI GDPg NODA Popg GINI  
1.000 0.076 0.099 0.110 0.598 -0.038 -0.590 -0.590 0.290 0.09 0.041 -0.433 -0.61 -0.109 Prop1 
 1.000 0.104 0.278 -0.065 0.884 -0.134 -0.134 -0.01 -0.04 0.031 0.006 -0.00 -0.066 Prop2 
  1.000 0.984 -0.606 -0.030 0.613 0.613 -0.06 -0.11 -0.06 0.019 -0.00 -0.340 Prop3 
   1.000 -0.597 0.166 0.559 0.559 -0.06 -0.12 -0.05 0.019 -0.00 -0.340 Prop4 
    1.000 -0.111 -0.974 -0.974 0.339 0.18 0.071 -0.332 -0.39 0.322 Prop5 
     1.000 -0.111 -0.111 -0.02 -0.03 0.019 0.134 0.10 -0.045 Prop6 
      1.000 1.000 -0.33 -0.17 -0.07 0.301 0.36 -0.311 Prop7 
       1.000 -0.33 -0.17 -0.07 0.301 0.36 -0.311 Prop8 
        1.000 -0.12 -0.02 -0.25 -0.42 0.144 Trade 
         1.000 -0.05 -0.095 0.01 0.179 IHDI 
          1.000 0.158 0.23 -0.148 GDPg 
           1.000 0.50 -0.175 NODA 
            1.000 -0.199 Popg 
             1.000 GINI 
Prop: Proposition. IHDI: Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index. GDPg: GDP growth rate. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance.  Popg: Population growth rate.  GINI: Inequality coefficient. 
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Appendix 3: Variable definitions  
Variables Signs Variable definitions Sources 
    
Inequality dependent variable 
Inequality  GINI GINI Coefficient WDI (World Bank) 
    
GDP based financial independent  variables  
    
Formal Financial 
Development  
Prop.1 Bank deposits/GDP. Bank deposits here refer to 
demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money 
banks (Lines 24 and 25 of International Financial 
Statistics (IFS); October 2008).  
Asongu (2012b) 
    
Semi-formal  financial 
development 
Prop.3   (Financial deposits – Bank deposits)/ GDP.    
Financial deposits are demand, time and saving 
deposits in deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions. (Lines 24, 25 and 45 of IFS, October, 
2008). 
Asongu(2012b) 
    
Informal  financial 
development 
Prop.3 (Money Supply – Financial deposits)/GDP Asongu (2012b) 
    
Informal and semi-formal 
financial development  
Prop.4 (Money  Supply –  Bank deposits)/GDP Asongu (2012b) 
    
M2-based financial  independent variables  
    
Financial intermediary 
formalization 
Prop.5 Bank deposits/ Money Supply (M2). From ‘informal 
and semi-formal’ to formal financial development 
(formalization) 
Asongu (2012b) 
    
Financial intermediary 
‘semi-formalization’ 
Prop.6 (Financial deposits - Bank deposits)/ Money Supply. 
From ‘informal and formal’ to semi-formal financial 
development (Semi-formalization) 
Asongu (2012b) 
    
Financial intermediary 
‘informalization’ 
Prop.7 (Money Supply – Financial deposits)/ Money Supply. 
From ‘formal and semi-formal’ to informal financial 
development (Informalisation). 
Asongu (2012b) 
    
Financial intermediary 
‘semi-formalization and 
informalization’ 
Prop.8 (Money Supply – Bank Deposits)/Money Supply.  
Formal to ‘informal and semi-formal’ financial 
development: (Semi-formalization and 
informalization). 
Asongu (2012b) 
    
Control variables  
    
Human Development  IHDI Inequality adjusted Human Development Index WDI (World Bank) 
    
Economic Prosperity  GDPg GDP growth rate (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Foreign-Aid  NODA Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Population Growth  Popg Population Growth Rate (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Trade Liberalization  Trade Imports + Exports of Commodities (% of GDP) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Instrumental variables  
    
Financial  system Depth  M2 Money Supply (% of GDP) FDSD (World Bank) 
    
Banking System Depth  Fdgdp  Liquid Liabilities (% of GDP) FDSD (World Bank) 
    
Banking System Efficiency  BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposit FDSD (World Bank) 
    
Financial System Efficiency  FcFd Financial credit on Financial deposit FDSD (World Bank) 
    
Banking System Activity  Pcrb Private domestic credit by deposit banks (% of GDP) FDSD (World Bank) 
    
Financial System Activity  Pcrbof Private domestic credit by deposit banks and other 
financial institutions (% of GDP) 
FDSD (World Bank) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  GDP: Gross Domestic Product. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database.  
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